

Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505


Executive Director

2 April 1982

NOTE FOR: DDCI

Bob:


Fred Hutchinson floated a proposal  
which would establish a 15 man staff  
under the NIOs for warning. Attached  
is my response.

  
John W. McMahon

Attachment: a/s

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2 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Hutchinson

FROM: John N. McMahon  
Executive Director

SUBJECT: NIC's 1 April Proposal to the DCI  
on Warning

1. I fear that the NIC proposal is nothing more than the re-establishment of the Strategic Warning Staff under a different name. The proposed NIO staff with 15 or more people is just another layer in our intelligence exchange mechanism. I was convinced in January at the NFIB meeting and remain so today that what is needed is not another group of people to tell the individual agencies how to worry about warning, but to ensure that there is a network of communications which permits intelligence information to flow freely one to the other.

2. The proposal suggests there is a clear need in the CIA to imbue more of the production analyst with a sense of responsibility for warning. In times past there was no need to because the analyst and everyone else were content that the Strategic Warning Staff had that bag to carry. I agree that it is the responsibility of the individual analyst and we should give them the responsibility through the normal institutional organizations and not set up a warning staff which would "tell them how to go about it." No one should know more about what's going on in the country than the analysts themselves and we ought to hold their feet to the fire in their respective organizations to get that done. What we need to ensure is the mechanical linkage for causing an exchange to take place.

3. Hence, I non-concur in the proposal. A single NIO for warning could make sure the linkage is there and that it remains viable and healthy and the NIO could cast the skeptical eye when need be but let the analyst do the work and not try to leer over them with folks in the cheap seats.

4. Relative to the comments to [redacted] who is retired and seems to want to remain that way, I don't think we would do ourselves any justice by having an individual involved who doesn't want white knuckle jobs. If there is any white knuckle job in the Community it should be the NIO for Warning. I suggest we let [redacted] remain retired.

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John N. McMahon

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

1 April 1982

NOTE: John McMahon  
Exec Dir/DCI

FROM: H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.  
NIO/W

*John:*

1. You recall that the Warning Working Group report was reviewed at the 19 January NFIB. That report was done in concordance with the DDCI's instructions; i.e. "Prepare a report that captures a Community consensus and does not provide recommendations." The report had a disaggregated array of options but did not package them for NFIB member selection.

2. Since the NFIB meeting, the DDCI has not said anything further to me about warning. The DCI, on the other hand, has been active in discussing the subject with me, my consultant [redacted] Harry Rowen, and Bob Gates. My guess is that he has also consulted others.


3. The DCI has indicated recently to Harry Rowen that the warning responsibility would be given to him. Harry would like to get DCI confirmation of that decision and approval of a concept for implementing the decision. I have prepared the attached paper for Harry Rowen's signature.

4. Your concurrence or comments are requested.

*Fred*  
H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

Attachment

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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #2690-82

1 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Henry S. Rowen  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT : Decision on Warning Working Group Report

1. Your approval is requested for the implementation of your decisions on warning as outlined in the memorandum. If this concept meets with your approval please sign the attached memorandum to the NFIB to get us started on the process of working out details of organization, procedures, and personnel.

2. We will construct a mechanism to draw upon the product and activities of the separate warning elements within the Intelligence Community. In the interests of economy, we will avoid unnecessary redundancy of warning activities. The most prominent example is the extensive, and expensive, ADP systems used to sort warning-related data in the DIA managed DoD I&W System. We will establish procedures to enable us to use the data and to respond to DoD requests for comment but we will not duplicate that activity.

3. On the other hand, there are warning-related analytical functions in the CIA, DIA, State/INR, and elsewhere that we will duplicate with the objective of ensuring the development of alternative views and avoiding the pitfalls of many recent warning failures. We are negotiating with [redacted] to serve as a special consultant for warning analysis.

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4. A brief discussion of where we stand with [redacted] would be appropriate. [redacted] is a rare talent and he is reasonably enthusiastic about applying it to the warning problem. His interest in warning is long-standing and he may have already described that to you. On the other hand, he has been explicit in stating what he does not want to do. He has made it a condition of his reemployment that he not be given any management responsibilities such as those

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SUBJECT: Decision on Warning Working Group Report

DDI #2690-82

1 April 1982

incurred by the NIO/Warning or the director of a warning staff. Fred Hutchinson has discussed with [ ] various ways of fitting [ ] into a warning mechanism and asked if he would consider being NIO, staff director, or whatever. [ ] reply was interesting. "I am retired, management chores are behind me, and I have no intention of getting into a white-knuckle job again. I want to deal only with ideas and substantive intelligence." We are refining with [ ] the details of how to do that in the role of "special assistant, special consultant, etc."

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5. The "no-surprise" doctrine in DCID 1/5 will be retained with the understanding that the definition will be expanded to include slower developing, longer term intelligence problems of social change and economic issues. There are limits, of course, to this expansion of the warning function and we are particularly sensitive to the danger of being distracted from the survival issues of big-W warning. We also recognize the requirement to warn, in a timely manner, of Iran-type situations of societal and political change. There is a clear need in the CIA to imbue more of the production office analysts with a sense of responsibility for warning. We will work closely with the DDI in this regard.

6. The procedures for integrating the various Community warning activities into a national warning system should be a bit more systematic than what has existed in the past. There appears to be support for a stronger leadership role by the DCI warning mechanism to coordinate policy and resource issues, to take the lead in premonitory analysis of warning issues and to facilitate the rapid and timely dissemination of warning intelligence at the national level. These objectives can be achieved by involving the NIOs and consultants as a collegial body in structured discussions of warning problems in addition to their role of individually leading monthly warning discussions of Community regional analysts. A national warning staff with representation from most of the Community, will be the mechanism for tending the warning machinery in Washington and providing a continuous DCI presence in the warning arena.

7. The structure of the national warning staff need not be decided in detail now. There is a consensus in the Community that the staff should have representation from at least, State, NSA, DIA, and CIA. The service intelligence chiefs have been somewhat ambivalent about committing themselves to filling billets but they probably will come up with a proposal to supply one man from each service or fill one billet in rotation among the three services. We have ten billets occupied today. I recommend that we fill the warning staff billets over the next year to its current authorization of about 15 professional and 5 clerical positions. A reasonable mix of talent and organizational representatives can be worked out by the Warning Working Group.

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SUBJECT: Decision on Warning Working Group Report

DDI #2690-82

1 April 1982

8. The directors of the warning staffs have been CIA officers with military deputies in recent years. There have been suggestions to change this to routinely have a military officer, detailed to CIA, serve as warning staff director. All agree that would provide a nice ecumenical touch but even the service intelligence chiefs are skeptical of their ability to turn up a well-qualified nominee. In the interest of getting a good director, soon, I recommend that we proceed to recruit the best qualified person recognizing that it likely will be a CIA officer.

9. The location of the staff is strongly influenced by space available. Space is available here for 2-3 people and in the Pentagon (present Strategic Warning Staff quarters) for about 10 people. There is a prevailing opinion that most of the warning staff should be here, to better serve you and to work with the DDI analytical elements. There also is a strong body of opinion, particularly among the military, that the warning staff should maintain a presence in the Pentagon. Thus, I recommend that we have elements of the staff in both places and adjust strength as we evolve in the next year.

10. The Warning Working Group has been a satisfactory body for providing the Community insight into the DCI warning activities and as a channel for suggesting change. I recommend that we continue it.

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12. This memorandum does not contain a full discussion of all the issues raised in the Warning Working Group Report. I do not

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SUBJECT: Decision on Warning Working Group Report DDI #2690-82  
1 April 1982

believe that you are required to make a decision on all these issues. Everything I have recommended is consistent with the working group consensus and the remarks at the NFIB. Therefore, I request your approval to proceed along the lines of this memorandum.

Henry S. Rowen

APPROVAL:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

DISAPPROVED:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

All Portions of this Memorandum  
are Classified SECRET

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D R A F T

DDI #2393-82  
31 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Observers of The National  
Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Decision on Warning Working Group Report

1. Your counsel at the NFIB meeting of 19 January when we discussed the Warning Working Group report was both valuable and appreciated. The national intelligence warning function is a fundamental responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence and I have taken care to seek a broad range of counsel on the warning issues.

2. Drawing upon the working group report for a frame of reference, I have made the following decisions:

a. The national intelligence warning system will draw upon the separate warning activities in the Intelligence Community, supplementing them as necessary from resources under DCI control, to meet the DCI responsibilities for warning.

b. The warning mission will be based upon the definition in DCID 1/5: "...to avoid surprise to the President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance..." That mission and definition will be expanded to ensure attention to slower developing, long-term intelligence problems.

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- c. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence will continue to oversee the national warning system and will exercise this authority with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
  - d. The direct operating responsibility for the national warning system will rest with the Chairman, National Intelligence Council. He will be assisted in these duties by the National Intelligence Officers and a warning staff.
  - e. The Warning Working Group has been a useful device to provide maximum visibility of the national warning system to the Intelligence Community and to facilitate participation by the separate warning elements. I request your continuing support of the working group.
3. The Chairman, National Intelligence Council, will work with you, largely through the Warning Working Group, to implement these decisions.

William J. Casey